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 Since 2000, the republics of Serbia and Croatia have had very dif-
ferent levels of achievement and success in transforming their na-
tional security orientations and doctrine, military structures, and pat-
terns of civil-military relations to conform to the expectations of the 
Atlantic and European communities. Both nations’ armed services 
and their respective ministries have abandoned old national security 
and defence strategies based upon nation state threats and both have 
substantially downsized their military force structures. Croatia, how-
ever, has been much more successful than Serbia in building a pro-
fessional, modern force that contributes to collective security in the 
region and it has made considerably more progress in articulating a 
vision of the future and in transforming civil-military relations to 
conform to the needs and expectations of a democratic society. A 
comparison of the process of reform and transformation between 
these states indicates that the consensus among Croatia’s political 
leaders to stand by the transformation process and the lack of agree-
ment among Serbia’s political leaders is the critical factor determin-
ing the relative success of the transformation process in civil-military 
relations in Serbia and Croatia. 
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Introduction 
 The dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia created unusually challenging 
complex and variable standards for civil military relations in the new succes-
sor states and for the roles of their armed forces. The two largest of these 
states, Croatia and Serbia, provide the most interesting contrasts for scholars 
and policy makers. Both states have approached the task of redefining their 
national security strategy from very different political perspectives and both 
have achieved very different results. 
 Although Croatia and Serbia have responded markedly differently to the 
need to transform their national security framework to conform to the new 
European continental realities, both militaries were faced with similar pres-
sures to undertake fundamental reforms. Both the Croatian and Serbian 
armed services had to implement dramatic reductions of the size of their 
military forces, as well as fundamental realignments of their national threat 
assessments and security strategies to conform to the norms advocated by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the evolving European 
Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The armed services 
and civilian heads in both nations clearly understood that they could not 
avoid fundamental reforms directed towards modernization of the armed 
services, interoperability with potential NATO or EU partners, and the rapid 
phase-out of conscription. Equally challenging, both nations’ armed forces 
discovered that they had to partner with new, inexperienced, and under-
funded state institutions to achieve the survival of the state security sector, 
allay domestic public concern about national security, and lay the founda-
tions for integrating the state within the security architecture of the European 
and the Atlantic communities. To compound the challenges, both the Croa-
tian and Serbian states were expected to undertake these efforts with excep-
tional speed and under exceptionally tight budgetary environments.  
 To meet the challenges listed above, both the Croatian and Serbian gov-
ernments had to commit to a transformation of civil military relations that 
went well beyond assuring simple civilian control of the military. In this new 
environment, civil military relations involved a qualitative shift in thinking 
and in behaviour for both the military and civilian government officials. The 
need was to create a pattern of relationships that can be characterized as 
truly democratic, and that was acceptable to their European and NATO part-
ners (Cottey et al., 2002).  
 This paper examines the impact of domestic political consensus in Serbia 
and Croatia in addressing the issue of the transformation of civil military re-
lations. It assesses the success of each state in implementing the specified 
NATO – ESDP performance measures applicable to the democratic trans-
formation of the armed services and the security sector. It also examines the 
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role that political consensus, or its absence, has had on progress in trans-
forming civil military relations. 
 The performance measures used to track and assess the readiness of an 
aspirant nation to affiliate with the Atlantic Alliance and ESDP include the 
following four criteria (Edmunds, 2006): 
1. Substitution of a national security and defence strategy based upon 
territorial-based threats, with a collective security defence strategy; 
2. Modernization, professionalization, and specialization of the armed 
forces, and abandonment of large, land-based conscript military forces; 
3. Full acceptance of, and democratic participation in, the collective secu-
rity decision-making process of the Alliance and ESDP; and 
4. Establishment of democratic civil-military relations to include a clear 
division of authority between the head of state and the head of govern-
ment; peacetime governmental or executive direction of the general staffs 
and commanders through the ministry of defence; legislative oversight of 
the defence and security organizations to include the budget; and popular 
perception that there is civilian and democratic control of the armed 
forces (Greenwood, 2005). 
 These four principles are the essential components of the North Atlantic 
and ESDP security frameworks; and they form the bases with which to as-
sess the success of democratic transformation in the role, purpose, mission 
and behaviour of the armed forces in Serbia and Croatia1. 
 
Serbia: An Insufficient Commitment 
 More than any other potential candidate for inclusion in the European 
security structures, Serbia’s continuing chaotic domestic politics have com-
plicated the process of transformation of the national security architecture. In 
contrast to many of the former communist nations who lobbied for NATO 
membership as early as 1992, Yugoslavia/Serbia, remained aloof, if not vis-
cerally opposed, to such ambitions. Under Slobodan Milošević’s regime 
Yugoslavia became the pariah of Europe. Yugoslavia/Serbia endured strin-
gent economic sanctions for nearly a decade; it pursued a nationalist military 
and national security strategy; it maintained large conscript army units that 
warred with its neighbours; its armed services were repeatedly used as a do-
mestic political weapon by the regime; and most significantly, it became the 
first European government in 1999 to challenge NATO and become em-
 
1 See the NATO Handbook (2001) to see how each of these themes inter-connects with each 
other and form the foundation for procedures and doctrine of the Alliance. 
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broiled in war with the Alliance. By the end of the century, civil control of 
the armed services had broken down and the military had become a state 
within the state under no effective civilian control (Vankovska & Wiberg, 
2003: 250-259).  
 The overthrow of Milošević in October 2000, while welcomed, did not 
resolve the fundamental issues dividing Serbia’s political system, particu-
larly with respect to national security and the role of the armed services. A 
substantial proportion of the citizenry still supported Milošević’s grand 
strategy of a “Greater Serbia”. Few in Serbia were ready to accept publicly 
Serbia’s borders without Kosovo, and there was considerable doubt over the 
ability of the newly elected democratic government to control the military, 
democratize the state, and seek permanent peace with Europe. Since October 
2000, every government in Serbia has felt constrained from making a com-
plete break with the past and from reconciling itself to a future in Europe and 
the North Atlantic community2. 
 Since the assassination in 2003 of Serbia’s prime minister, Zoran Đinđić, 
the Serb government has recognized the necessity to forestall a complete 
breakdown of society by wresting control over the security sector, including 
the armed services (Edmunds, 2005); and in recent years, many fundamental 
reforms have been undertaken. These reform steps include the adoption of 
defence legislation, adoption of a new constitution, acceptance in the Part-
nership for Peace (PfP) program in 2006, and a significant increase in bilat-
eral military contacts and exercises between the Serbian military and US and 
other NATO member nations. By 2008, the Serbian armed services had been 
significantly downsized, basic national security documents had been adopted 
by the parliament, and the Serbian military no longer had the capability to 
directly and imminently threaten its neighbours.  
 Despite all these activities, there are significant unresolved policy ques-
tions, and the government lacks the political capacity to articulate a decisive 
security policy. The political system is still sharply divided over what should 
be done in the security and defence sectors, and there is no consensus over 
the future direction of the nation.  
 
Expectation 1 – Principles of Threat Assessment and Strategy in Serbia 
 In 2005-2006, the Ministry of Defence, Office of the President, and the 
General Staff prepared and adopted a set of documents, culminating in the 
 
2 Past and current Serbian governments have cooperated with the ICTY and have under-
taken fundamental changes in the personnel structure of the Serbian general officer corps. These 
actions, however, have been incremental, limited in scope, and accompanied by substantial po-
litical criticism and opposition. 
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Strategic Defence Review (SDR) adopted by the Skupština in October 
20063. The SDR outlined the form and direction of military reform for the 
period through 2015 and it articulated a vision that recognized the need for 
Serbia to engage in international cooperation and to foster interdependencies 
with NATO (SDR, 2006: 1.1.1). The document projected minimal danger to 
Serbia from traditional state threats and it, in accordance with NATO, de-
fined the national security threats to be terrorism, organized crime, weapons 
proliferation, ethnic and religious extremism, and illegal immigration (SDR 
2006, 1.1.1). Within the region, the SDR made an unqualified commitment 
to cooperate with neighbouring states to combat the threats listed above 
(SDR, 2006: 1.1.2). The SDR, in short, fully committed Serbia’s armed 
forces to a national strategic plan and threat assessment fully compliant with 
NATO expectations. 
 While the 2006 SDR is an impressive document on paper and outlines a 
sharp break with past practice, the political elites, political parties, govern-
ment, and public have not internalized, given their full approval to, or even 
agreed with all the policies represented in the Plan (Helsinki, 2008: 163-
187). It is likely that much of the SDR was drafted primarily by the Ministry 
of Defence and General Staff to reflect a desire by the Serbian armed forces 
to reduce their international isolation, and there does not seem to be a com-
mensurate commitment by the political leadership to advance collective se-
curity through NATO (Gazdag et al., 2007: 53).  
 Governmental, parliamentary, and public resistance to cooperation with 
NATO is still intense. In December 2007, for example, the Skupština 
adopted a Resolution on the Military Neutrality of Serbia which, among 
other points, required a national referendum prior to any talks or negotiations 
with NATO, and which reiterated its condemnation of NATO for its “ag-
gression” in the occupation of Kosovo4. Among the public, nearly a fifth of 
Serbs polled (19%) in April 2007 agreed that the Serbian Army’s poor 
reputation should be attributed to its involvement with NATO integration, 
and half of the respondents in the same poll opposed any Serbian application 
for entry into NATO5.  
 In brief, the Republic of Serbia has taken the formal moves to accommo-
date itself to the NATO-ESDP expectations of a national security strategy 
 
3 The three most significant documents are the Defence White Paper – Bela knjiga odbrane 
(2005), Defence Strategy (2005), and the Strategic Defence Review – Strategijski pregled od-
brane (2006) 
4 The Resolution was part of the reaction of the Skupstina to the impending independence 
declaration of Kosovo and President Tadić argued that it should not be viewed as a formal re-
jection of army reforms and the SDR. 
5 Vojska je oslabljena, Glas Javnosti, April 16, 2007.  
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whose foundations are regional cooperation and multilateral collective secu-
rity under the NATO-ESDP umbrellas. This is not an insignificant achieve-
ment, considering that Serbia and NATO were at war less than a decade ago. 
The challenge, however, will be to forge the national will in Serbia to go be-
yond the printed formal documents and to embrace the European collective 
security vision. The impediments are political, not legal or military; and the 
solution can only be found in the Serbian political arena. 
 
Expectation 2 – Modernization and Organization of the Serbian Armed 
Forces 
 Over the last few years, the Serbian Ministry of Defence has significantly 
downsized and restructured the armed forces. The total size of Ser-
bian/Yugoslav army had declined from a peak of 180,000 in 1990 to 45,000 
in 20066; and it is expected to decline to 26,500 in 2010 when conscription is 
scheduled to end (SDR, 2006: 6.1.1). 
 The nearly two decades of downsizing of the Serbian armed forces, how-
ever, has created a large pool of retired officers, many relatively young and 
with few skills transferable to the civilian economy. For example, in 2007 
Serbia had 15 active duty general officers and 756 retired general officers 
(Helsinki, 2008: 176). In addition, the veteran’s organization and retired of-
ficers associations are large and political powerful and have been less sup-
portive of the Ministry and General Staff’s plans to transform the armed ser-
vices (Helsinki, 2008: 181-183).  
 There are other anomalies in the force reduction program as well. In 
2007, over 44% of the Serbian armed forces were officers and 39% of the 
officers held the rank of Lt. Colonel or above (Helsinki, 2008, p. 176). Thus, 
the armed services, while substantially reduced in size, have not altered the 
composition of the force structure to conform to its much smaller base.  
 In contrast to the downsizing and restructuring of the Serbian armed 
forces, there has been less visible progress in modernizing the forces and in 
assuring the public that the armed forces can be both smaller in total size and 
be more effective. Large segments of the public are concerned that the 
armed forces do not have the skills and resources to carry out its primary 
mission to defend the state. In 2007, 55% of Serb citizens polled believed 
that the Serbian army was incapable of defending the integrity of Serbia7. In 
2008, less than 14% of the public characterized the Serbian army as profes-
 
6 Source Pietz (2005), p. 14. 
7 Vojska je oslabljena, Glas Javnosti, April 16, 2007. 
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sional8. Since 2003 there have been sharp declines registered in the confi-
dence of the public in the army, as well as drops in public confidence of the 
civilian and military commanders (Hadžić, 2005). The same series of studies 
underscores public concern about living conditions for all ranks in the armed 
services and a growing uneasiness about the impact that downsizing and re-
structuring are having upon military readiness. 
 The transformation of a military force from a structure oriented towards 
large land-based armies to a smaller, more capable, professional, and mod-
ern equipped force is difficult and requires understanding from the political 
leadership and long-term financial support from the state. In Serbia, neither 
of these factors is available. The political leaders are divided on how to en-
gage with Europe and NATO. Major political parties, including the Serbian 
Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, oppose engagement and 
are uncomfortable with the direction of military reform. In addition, the re-
maining state industries associated with armaments (e.g. Zastava) are con-
cerned about their continued survival in a highly technical and modern mili-
tary environment. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, Serbia, without 
significant external support, cannot commit the financial resources to carry 
out a comprehensive military modernization program. 
 
Expectation 3 – Full Acceptance by Serbia of Alliance Decision-Making 
Process 
 Within Serbia, the legitimacy of NATO, the desirability of joining 
NATO, and public confidence in NATO are all extremely low. Public opin-
ion polls consistently underscore sharp disagreements among Serbs over the 
desirability of Serbia becoming a NATO member. In a poll conducted in 
September 2007, 55% of the Serb public opposed joining NATO, while only 
28% supported such a move. During the period from July 2005 to September 
2007, support for Serbia joining NATO among the public never exceeded 
32%, while it recorded a low of 22% support9  
 Opposition in Serbia to NATO or EU-led collective security is also high. 
In February 2008, 59% of the Serbian public polled registered disagreement 
with Serbia participating in peace missions10. In addition, public opposition 
to cooperating with the ICTY remains strong, and both major segments of 
 
8 TNS Medium Gallup, Serbian Public About Security Sector, February 2008 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.yu/TNS_Medium_Gallup_AS_-_engleski.ppt#31 
9 Source: Branković, Srbobran, Serbian Public on Euro-Atlantic Integrations, TNS Medium 
Gallup http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.yu/TNS_Medium_Gallup-engleski_13.12.2007..ppt#1 
10 TNS Medium Gallup, Serbian Public About Security Sector, February 2008 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org.yu/TNS_Medium_Gallup_AS_-_engleski.ppt#31 
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the population and political leadership disagree with NATO and EU efforts 
to apprehend and try those Serbs indicted for war crimes11. 
 On the issue of NATO and eventual membership, everything is overshad-
owed by the inability of the Serbian political leadership to accept the loss of 
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo (Batt, 2005). For the largest political party 
in Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party, non-compliance with NATO on this is-
sue is non-negotiable. For other political parties, NATO is not a desirable 
strategic partner, and open discussions on the merits of membership are po-
litically toxic. For the government, it would be political suicide to accept 
NATO’s past and current decisions and policies in Kosovo and in the West-
ern Balkans. Without a change in the political climate this expectation will 
not be met in the foreseeable future. 
 
Expectation 4 – Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Serbia 
 Assessing the quality of democratic civil-military relations is a subjective 
exercise, and the standards of excellence or measures of full compliance 
with NATO-ESDP expectations are difficult to measure precisely. For Ser-
bia, it appears that the military is now under civilian control, but it is not so 
clear that the control is exercised or managed in a clearly democratic way.  
 For Serbia, the effort for the civilian government to exercise civilian con-
trol was not an easy task. By October 2000, when Milošević was finally re-
moved from power, nearly all of the military command hierarchy had been 
linked to the old regime and had been accustomed to intervening in domestic 
political affairs (Edmunds, 2003a). In the immediate period following 
Milošević’s ouster, the army was considered to be an important player in 
political affairs; its support was important for political stability; and its con-
stitutional status under the federal presidency of the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro immunized it from serious civilian control (Edmunds, 
2003b: 28-35).  
 Since 2003, much of the necessary legal groundwork for democratic 
civil-military relations has been formally adopted, but much of that ground-
work is very recent and has not been tested. A new constitution for Serbia 
was adopted in 2006, but it was not until December 2007 that the Skupština 
adopted a new law on defence and a new law on the army to regulate na-
tional security affairs and democratic civil-military relations (Popović, 
2008a). 
 
11 Public Opinion in Serbia: Views on Domestic War Crimes, the ICTY and Hague Tribu-
nal. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, December 2006. 
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 Until recently, peacetime direction of the general staff and commanders 
through the Ministry of Defence was largely conducted by military officers, 
and the Ministry lacked professional civilian competencies and expertise to 
manage and direct national defence activities (Popović, 2008b: 3). For ex-
ample, in 2005, the Minister of Defence, Zoran Stanković, had been ap-
pointed to the position when he was still serving as a major general in the 
armed services, and his highest ranking deputy in the ministry at that time 
had no prior experience in military affairs12.  
 Legislative oversight of the defence and security organizations to include 
the budget is exceptionally weak (Edmunds, 2005:123), and the Skupština 
lacks the staff to engage in serious and detailed oversight of military affairs 
or security affairs (Janković, 2006). In addition, the Skupština is highly frac-
tionalized and individual members have little autonomy, resources, or op-
portunities to engage in serious debate on national security issues (Edmunds, 
2008), or to conduct meaningful legislative oversight (Helsinki, 2008: 235-
259).  
 A fourth indicator of democratic civil-military relations is the extent to 
which there is a popular perception that democratic civil-military relations 
exist. In a nationwide poll, conducted in February 2008, only 15% of the 
public affirmed that there was democratic civil control over the security 
sector13. More worrisome may be the findings from other surveys that 
consistently indicate relatively weak support for democratic control and pro-
cedures in Serbia and an uncomfortably low level of support for democracy 
(40% support), particularly among the Serbian Radical Party members (14% 
support)14. 
 In summary, Serbia has formally adopted a strategy based on collective 
security in accordance with NATO principles, but the government has not 
internalized this approach. Formally, Serbia has put together a program of 
modernization and professionalism, but it lacks the resources and consistent 
political support to carry it out. Formally, Serbia has accepted NATO’s col-
lective security decision-making process, but politically, many Serbs feel 
alienated from, if not opposed to, NATO affiliation. Formally, Serbia has 
laid the groundwork for democratic civil-military relations, but in practice, 
 
12 Both served in their capacity until May 2007 and the formation of a new government. 
The current Minister, Dragan Šutanovac, had served prior to his appointment as the Chairman 
of the Legislative Committee on Defence 
13 TNS Medium Gallup, Serbian Public About Security Sector, February 2008 http://www. 
atlanticcouncil.org.yu/TNS_Medium_Gallup_AS_-_engleski.ppt#31 
14 See Centre for Free Elections and Democracy: Belgrade (Summer 2006). The question 
was “Do you agree that democracy is the best form of government?” 
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democratic civil military relations have not been tested and significant po-
litical groupings do not share these values.  
 In brief, Serbia has a great deal of distance to go before it fulfils the crite-
ria for inclusion in the European collective security network. The impedi-
ments are the same; namely, the political process is consumed with Kosovo 
and the political leaders are too lacking in trust and may be too willing to 
suspend democratic values for immediate political gain. 
 
Croatia: A Full and Permanent Commitment 
 In April 2008, Croatia received an invitation to join NATO and it became 
a full member of the North Atlantic community in April 2009. During the 
period beginning in 2000, Croatia successfully implemented deep reforms in 
its conception of national security, force structure, relationship to NATO and 
its neighbours, and development of democratic civil military relations. These 
changes were not easy, and they occurred at a time when Croatia had to 
learn to work democratically in its domestic politics, reorganize its economy 
from a wartime footing, stabilize its relations with its neighbours, comply 
with the ICTY, and control its borders and insulate itself from the instability 
in neighbouring Bosnia and Yugoslavia/Serbia.  
 In contrast to Serbia, however, there has been broad agreement among all 
the major political parties in Croatia since 2000 on the fundamental strategic 
perspectives and values. While Croatia’s party and parliamentary politics 
were vibrant and full of conflict, the major political parties, the political 
leadership, and overwhelming majority of the populace supported the con-
cept of European integration and affiliation with the North Atlantic commu-
nity. Unlike the situation in Serbia, the decision to reorient Croatia’s security 
in conformity with NATO-ESDP guidelines was collective, and it was 
shared by all significant elements of the political system.  
 Also unlike Serbia, Croatia had adopted all its basic documents on na-
tional security and military organization by 2003 (Kranjčec, 2004). By 2002, 
the Sabor had adopted its first National Security Strategy, its first Defence 
Strategy, its Law on Defence, and the Security Services Act (Volten, 2005). 
Thus, the assessment on Croatia can focus on results and implementation, 
not just intent and law. 
 
Expectation 1 – Principles of Threat Assessment and Strategy in Croatia 
 In 2002, the Croatian parliament adopted a series of policies that explic-
itly defined the national security and military strategy of the Republic. The 
fundamental document was the National Security Strategy of Croatia (2002 
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NSSC) which defined the principle threats, goals, objectives and strategy for 
the Republic’s national security (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002). Among other points, 
the 2002 NSSC stressed Croatia’s overriding interest in joining the EU and 
NATO, and it expressed Croatia’s full acceptance and support for the values 
of collective security (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002: par. 9). The document mirrors 
the threats and concerns of other NATO nations, but also stresses the posi-
tive potential contribution of Croatia’s membership and participation in col-
lective security to security in Southeastern Europe.  
 Consistently since 2002, official Croatian documents reiterated and 
strengthened the state’s commitment to collective security articulated in the 
2002 NSSC. For example, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2005 re-
inforced the values and goals of the National Security Strategy discussed 
above, but it also underscored how the lowered probability of a direct mili-
tary threat to Croatia opened up opportunities for reform and restructuring of 
the Croatian defence structure. Even Croatia’s annual reports on defence 
planning to the OSCE repeatedly reinforced the commitment and importance 
of collective security. These and related documents underscore that acces-
sion to the NATO alliance is the primary national security goal for Croatia 
(OSCE, 2008: 3).  
 The extent to which Croatia followed up on and internalized its written 
commitments to collective security is open to interpretation, but its formal 
adherence to the principle is clear. It could be argued that Croatia, as was the 
case in other formerly socialist states, suffers from poorly developed military 
and defence planning capabilities, and that the planning documents are es-
sentially military staff exercises in which the civilian authorities have little 
direct involvement (Nelson, 2004). Others point out that the national strate-
gic documents may reflect an artificial set of threat priorities predominantly 
determined by an external security agenda (i.e. placating NATO officials), 
and that they may not fully reflect indigenous national security concerns 
(Gazdag et al., 2007).  
 Nevertheless, despite reservations regarding initial motivations, there is 
common agreement that Croatia has consistently contributed to regional se-
curity structures and missions for both NATO and the ESDP (Pietz & Re-
millard, 2006). It is also clear that the consistently unqualified leadership 
support for the strategy has done much to quell potential domestic xenopho-
bia and nationalism in Croatia (Staničić, 2007). Overall, Croatia has made a 
strong commitment to accepting NATO’s collective security values, and it 
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Expectation 2 – Modernization and Organization of the Croatian Armed 
Forces 
 The initiative to modernize and restructure the Croatian military in 2000 
originated with the Račan government, not with the armed services or gen-
eral staff. In 2000, many of the personnel in the Ministry of Defence lacked 
professional expertise and training to administer a peacetime ministry, and 
many of the personnel had strong ties to the ruling party of the Tuđman re-
gime (i.e. HDZ). Much of the military command had also been politicized 
under the Tuđman regime, and the politically powerful veterans organiza-
tions were accustomed to playing major roles in defence and national secu-
rity decision-making (Edmunds, 2007). From the newly elected govern-
ment’s perspective, the modernization, professionalization, and restructuring 
of the Croatian armed forces became the mechanisms through which the ci-
vilian leadership was able to reassert control over the military, carry out its 
cherished vision to pursue European and North Atlantic integration, and 
achieve control over the national defence budget. 
 From a national security perspective, Croatia’s pursuit of integration and 
collective security through the modernization and restructuring program also 
made considerable sense. Croatia’s territorial boundaries do not lend them-
selves to a doctrine of in-depth territorial defence based upon large, land-
based and heavily armoured armies. Maintaining such a force structure in 
Croatia would be both strategically ineffective and fiscally overwhelming. In 
addition, following NATO’s air war in Kosovo in 1999, the nature of the 
likely threat against Croatia had changed from a state-on-state conflict to 
threats requiring smaller, agile, modern, and professional military units. 
 To accomplish the modernization and restructuring program, the Govern-
ment of Croatia adopted a long-term and detailed planning program to re-
duce the overall size of the armed forces; resettle redundant military person-
nel into the civilian economy; reconfigure the disposition of forces, their ar-
maments, and their mission; reinvigorate professional military education in 
conformity with NATO and ESDP doctrine and practice; reallocate and re-
duce the military budget to focus on modernization; and integrate Croatian 
military units into NATO and PfP operations and exercises. 
 Under the modernization and restructuring program, personnel strength 
of the Croatian armed forces during 2000 to 2007 dropped nearly 70% from 
60,000 to 18,000 persons under arms (OSCE, 2008: 13). To ease the transi-
tion, Croatia introduced a retraining and resettlement program for its redun-
dant military personnel (SPECTRA), and it designated funds from base con-
versions and closures to help fund the program15. The percentage of the state 
 
15 The SPECTRA program is not as fully funded as the need requires, and base conversions 
have occurred at a slower than anticipated rate (Pietz & Remillard, 2006). 
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budget and GDP designated for defence has also dropped. In 2000, five per-
cent of the GDP and 19% of the state budget was designated for defence 
(Bellamy 2002:165). In 2007, only 1.7% of GDP and 4% of the state budget 
were allocated to defence needs (OSCE, 2008: 29)16.  
 The extent to which Croatia has simultaneously downsized and reconfig-
ured its armed forces should not be discounted. Unlike Serbia, the personnel 
downsizing have affected all ranks in the Croatian armed services, and the 
officer structure, although still somewhat top heavy, is not excessively 
weighted towards senior officers. Armaments and equipment have been 
linked to specified tasks and decisions have been made through 2015 for re-
ductions, procurement and replacements of all weapons systems and facili-
ties down to the unit level (Ministry of Defence RC, 2006). The government 
has also made considerable investments in the recruitment, retention, pro-
motion, education and training of military personnel towards the goal of cre-
ating a highly professional military force (Bellamy & Edwards, 2005), and it 
abolished conscription in 2008 to reinforce the professionalization of the 
armed services. 
 Significantly, Croatia has taken a leading role in participating in collec-
tive security operations. It is a founding member of the Adriatic Charter and 
it has been heavily involved in regional exercises with both the ESDP and 
NATO. Overall, it can be concluded that Croatia has made the commitment 
and implemented a fundamental transformation in the restructuring, profes-
sionalization, and modernization of its armed forces. 
 
Expectation 3 – Full Acceptance by Croatia of Alliance Decision-Making 
Process 
 Since 2000, the governments of Croatia have been fully supportive of 
joining NATO’s collective security system, and they have been markedly 
supportive and involved in integrating within the Alliance (Božinović, 
2007). Croatia is a founding member of the Adriatic Charter, along with Al-
bania and Macedonia (Grdešić, 2004). It has participated in numerous 
NATO exercises and it has radically reorganized and restructured its armed 
forces to integrate its logistics, communications, training, and procurement 
systems with NATO and the ESDP (Barić, 2006).  
 Overall, there has been little, if any, hesitation on the part of Croatia to 
accept the obligations, costs, and responsibilities of membership in NATO 
and the EU-ESDP. If anything, Croatia has been enthusiastic in its support, 
 
16 The Long-Term Development plan estimates that 2% of GDP and 5.4% of the state 
budget will be allocated to defence in 2010 (Source: MOD, 2006: 69). 
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generous in its contributions, and willing to accommodate its military struc-
ture and doctrine to integrate fully in the NATO structure. 
 
Expectation 4 – Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Croatia 
 Democratic civil-military relations in Croatia have evolved considerably 
since 2000 when “seven serving and five retired generals wrote an open let-
ter to the government attacking its policies and accusing it of ‘slandering of 
war heroes’,” forcing President Mesić to demand the resignation of the 
serving generals and establish a precedent of civilian control over the mili-
tary (Edmunds, 2007: 62). For Croatia, forging democratic civil-military re-
lations has been a long and continuous process that has traversed several 
stages, including the establishment of civilian control, depoliticization of the 
armed forces, and democratization of civil-military relations. While progress 
in this area has not always been linear, it has been substantial (Bellamy & 
Edmunds, 2005). 
 In accordance with the Defence Law and the National Security Strategy 
of 2002, the government executed a concerted program to professionalize 
and depoliticize the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence towards the 
goal of integration of Croatia with NATO and the EU (Bellamy 2002). The 
program represented a virtual revolution in Croatian civil-military affairs; 
and by early 2004, the national security sector had substantially enhanced its 
professional capabilities, reduced its size, and sharply reduced the level of 
politicization in both the Ministry and in the armed forces (Bellamy & Ed-
munds, 2005). While nepotism or corruption may still exist, neither is en-
demic or widespread in the national security sector. 
 Weaknesses, however, still exist in Croatia’s civil-military relations that 
impact on an assessment of full democratization. For example, the divisions 
of authority between the civilian and military leadership are not fully pro-
scribed; and, on occasion, the initiators for action and implementation of 
policy are unclear (Bellamy & Edmunds, 2005: 75). Low salaries and high 
turnover have made it difficult to recruit and retain optimal civilian expertise 
in the Ministry of Defence (Nelson, 2004) and the painfully slow develop-
ment of fiscal public accountability standards and transparency has hindered 
the ability of the Ministry and Government to provide consistent fiscal over-
sight (Greenwood, 2003). Finally, the parliament still lacks the staff and ex-
pertise to provide full independent oversight of the budget and processes in 
the defence sector (Staničić, 2005).  
 In summary, what is remarkable about the Croatian case is the extent to 
which there has been consistency for nearly a full decade in the support for 
directed change in the national security sector. While the changes have been 
sweeping and while there has been resistance to some of the changes, the 
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programs for reform have stayed on a reasonably constant path. Croatia has 
been a reliable partner for NATO and the EU-ESDP. Croatia’s political 
leadership has minimized its political partisan involvement in national secu-
rity affairs. Significantly, the Croatian campaign to adopt collective security 
has helped transform its strategy and doctrine, its force structure and admini-
stration, its values and politics, and its civil-military relations.  
 
Conclusion 
 The divergent experiences of Serbia and Croatia in transforming their na-
tional security architectures to integrate within the European and Atlantic de-
fence communities indicate that the success of the transformation process 
depends heavily upon achieving a broad-based, consensual, and long-term 
political commitment to the transformation process. In the case of Serbia, 
political commitment was lacking, and the transformation process has been 
severely handicapped. In the case of Croatia, that political commitment was 
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